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Abstract. Relay attacks (and, more generally, man-in-the-middle attacks) are a
serious threat against many access control and payment schemes. In this work,
we present distance-bounding protocols, how these can deter relay attacks, and
the security models formalizing these protocols. We show several pitfalls mak-
ing existing protocols insecure (or at least, vulnerable, in some cases). Then, we
introduce the SKI protocol which enjoys resistance to all popular attack-models
and features provable security. As far as we know, this is the first protocol with
such all-encompassing security guarantees.
1 Why Distance-Bounding?
It is well known that a chess beginner can win against a chess grand-master easily
by defeating two grand-masters concurrently, taking different colors in both games,
and relaying the move of one master to the other. This is a pure relay attack where
two masters play against each other while each of them thinks he is playing against a
beginner.
In real life, relay attacks find applications in access control. For instance, a car with
a wireless key can be opened by relaying the communication between the key (the
token) and the car. RFID-based access control to buildings can also be subject to relay
attacks [21]. The same goes for (contactless) credit-card payments: a customer may try
to pay for something on a malicious terminal which relays to a fake card paying for
something more expensive [15].
To defeat relay attacks, Brands and Chaum [9] introduced the notion of distance
bounding protocol. This relies on the fact that information is local and it cannot travel
faster than light. So, an RFID reader can identify when participants are close enough
because the round-trip communication time has been small enough. The idea is that a
prover holding a key x proves to a verifier that he is close to him. Ideally, this notion
should behave like a traditional interactive proof system in the sense that it must satisfy:
– completeness (i.e., an honest prover close to the verifier will pass the protocol with
high probability)
? This invited paper summarizes results from [4,5,6,7,8].
– soundness (i.e., if the verifier accepts the protocol, then it must be the case that the
information held by all close participants includes x)
– security (i.e., if the prover honestly runs the protocol, the provided information does
not provide any advantage to defeat soundness).
The last property is weaker than zero-knowledge and is generally required in identifica-
tion protocols. In practice, the literature does not define distance-bounding like this but
rather considers several popular threat models, as per the following summary.
– Distance fraud [9]: a far-away malicious prover tries to pass the protocol.
– Mafia fraud [14]: an adversary between a far-away honest prover and a verifier tries
to get advantage of his position to make the verifier accept. (This generalizes relay
attacks as the adversary may also modify messages.)
– Terrorist fraud [14]: a far-away malicious prover, with the help of an adversary,
tries to make the verifier accept, but without giving the adversary any advantage to
later pass the protocol alone. For instance, the malicious prover wants to make the
verifier accept, although he is far away, but does not want to give his secret x to the
adversary.
– Impersonation fraud [3]: An adversary tries to impersonate the prover and make
the verifier accept.
– Distance hijacking [13]: A far-away prover takes advantage of some honest provers
running the protocol to make the verifier accept.
In our model [8], we factor all these common threats into three possible frauds.
– Distance fraud: this is the classical notion in which we also consider concurrency
with many other participants. I.e., we include other possible provers (with other
secrets) and verifiers. Consequently, our generalized distance fraud also includes
distance hijacking.
– Man-in-the-middle: we consider an adversary (maybe at several locations) who can
interact with many honest provers (possibly with different keys) and verifiers during
a learning phase. Then, the attack phase contains honest provers with the key x, far
away from a verifier V , and possibly many other honest provers (with other keys)
and other verifiers. The goal of the adversary is to makeV accept the prover holding
x. Clearly, this generalizes mafia fraud and includes impersonation fraud.
– Collusion fraud: A far-away prover holding x helps an adversary to make the ver-
ifier accept the proof. This might be in the presence of many other honest partici-
pants. However, there should be no man-in-the-middle attack constructed based on
this malicious prover. I.e., the adversary should not extract from him any advantage
to run (later) a man-in-the-middle attack.
Ideally, we could just keep this last notion which includes all others and is closer to the
soundness and the security notion in the interactive proof system.
We summarize the best security results for many existing distance-bounding proto-
cols. Table 1 gives the probability of success of the best known attacks. This table does
not consider possibly bad pseudorandom function (PRF) instances [5] nor any terrorist
fraud based on noise tolerance [19]. These aspects will be discussed later in the present
paper. For collusion-frauds, we consider a prover leaking all but n bits of his secret.
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Table 1. Best Attack Results on Existing Distance-Bounding Protocols [7]
Protocol Success Probability
Distance-Fraud MIM Collusion-Fraud
Brands & Chaum [9] (1=2)n [18] (1=2)n [25] 1 [25]
Bussard & Bagga [10] 1 [4] (1=2)n [10] 1 [4]
Cˇapkun et al. (SECTOR) [11] (1=2)n [18] (1=2)n [25] 1 [25]
Hancke & Kuhn [20] (3=4)n [18] (3=4)n [25] 1 [25]
Reid et al. [34] (3=4)n [18] (3=4)n or 1 [26,4] (3=4)n [25]
Singele´e & Preneel [35] (1=2)n [18] (1=2)n [25] 1 [25]
Tu & Piramuthu [36] (3=4)n [30] 1 [25] (3=4)n [30]
Munilla & Peinado [29] (3=4)n [18] (3=5)n [18] 1 [18]
Swiss-Knife [25] (3=4)n [25] (1=2)n [25] (3=4)n [25]
Kim & Avoine [24] (7=8)n [18] (1=2)n [18] 1 [18]
Nikov & Vauclair [31] 1=k* [25] (1=2)n [25] 1 [25]
Avoine et al. [2] (3=4)n [2] (2=3)n [2] (2=3)n [2]
* k is an additional parameter in this protocol.
2 Towards a Secure Protocol
We first look at the Hancke-Kuhn protocol [20] in Fig. 1. Here, we use a symmetric key
x and two vectors a1;a2 of n bits which are derived from an exchange of nonces. Then,
the distance bounding phase proceeds in n rounds. In each round, the verifier selects a
random ci 2 f1;2g, sends it to the prover and expects to receive ri, the ith bit of aci . The
verifier measures the round-trip communication time and rejects the proof if it took too
long to respond or the response is incorrect.
This protocol is vulnerable to a trivial terrorist fraud (actually, it was not meant to
resist to it): the malicious prover does the initial phase which is not time-critical, then
gives a1 and a2 to the adversary who can become a proxy for the prover to the verifier.
Clearly, a1 and a2 do not leak x.
To fix this problem, Reid et al. [34] introduce the protocol in Fig. 2 which we call
DBENC in [5]. Here, only a1 is derived from the initial nonces and a2 is set to a1 x.
So, a malicious prover providing a1 and a2 to an adversary would also leak x.
First of all, we stress that nonces must really be “numbers once used”, as their name
suggests. I.e., they shall not repeat. Otherwise, this protocol (as well as many others)
would leak some sensitive information, as noticed in [28].
Second, we observe that this protocol unfortunately becomes vulnerable to a man-
in-the-middle attack [25]. The idea of the attack is that the adversary relays, during
a learning phase, the communication between a close prover and a verifier, but flips
one challenge c j. The value r j which is sent as a response to the verifier is selected
at random. So, from the prover, the adversary learns the response to c j, and by the
final output of the verifier (acceptance or rejection), the adversary deduces what is the
correct answer to 1  c j. So, he learns the jth bit of a1 and a2 and deduces x j. He can
repeat this for each j and infer x. Then, the attack phase just impersonates the prover to
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Verifier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
pick NV
NV          !
NP            pick NP
a1ka2 = fx(NP;NV ) a1ka2 = fx(NP;NV )
distance bounding phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1;2g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =

a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
check responses
check timers OutV          !
Fig. 1. The Hancke-Kuhn Distance-Bounding protocol [20]
Verifier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
pick NV
NV          ! pick NP
a1 = fx(NP;NV )
NP            a1 = fx(NP;NV )
a2 = a1 x a2 = a1 x
distance bounding phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1;2g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri = aci;i
check responses
check timers OutV          !
Fig. 2. The DBENC Distance-Bounding protocol [34,5]
4
the verifier, thanks to x. Other instances of DBENC where a2 = a1 x are replaced by
addition modulo some q or addition with a random factor, can also be broken, as shown
in [4].
In [28], it was suggested to replace a1 = fx(NP;NV ) and a2 = a1 x by a1ka2 =
fx(NP;NV ) and a release of (R;xhR(a1;a2)) for some random R, where h is a universal
hash function. However, proving the security of such a protocol does not seem to be
easy.
Verifier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
NP            pick NP
pick NV
NV          !
a1ka2 = fx(NP;NV ) a1ka2 = fx(NP;NV )
distance bounding phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1;2;3g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =
8<:
a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
xia1;ia2;i if ci = 3
check responses
check timers
OutV          !
Fig. 3. The TDB Distance-Bounding protocol [2]
The problem seems more easily amended by considering the TDB protocol [2] in
Fig. 3. Now, there are three possible challenges ci 2 f1;2;3g. The answer to 1 and to
2 consists of bits from a1 and a2, respectively. Both a1 and a2 are derived from the
nonces. The answer to 3 is a bit from a3 = a1 a2 x. The main idea is that we use
a threshold secret-sharing scheme to split xi into three shares, so that two shares alone
leak no information.
The security of TDB assumes that f is a PRF. Unfortunately, this assumption alone
is not enough to guarantee the security and some related security results from the lit-
erature are incorrect. Indeed, as shown in [5], we can artificially construct PRFs which
make the protocol insecure. The PRF construction is done by PRF programming. For
instance, given a PRF g, we construct a new function f defined by the following in-
stances:
fx(NP;NV ) =

xkx if NP = x
gx(NP;NV ) otherwise
We can easily show that f is also a PRF [5]. When the TDB protocol is instantiated with
this f , a malicious prover can mount a distance fraud by selecting NP = x. Indeed, we
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would have a1 = a2 = a3. So, the response ri is predicted before receiving the challenge
ci. Consequently, the prover can make sure that the response arrives on time, without
even knowing ci: he just replies before receiving ci.
Verifier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
pick a, NV
NP            pick NP
M = a fx(NP;NV ) M;NV          ! a=M fx(NP;NV )
distance bounding phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1;2;3g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =
8<:
a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
xia1;ia2;i if ci = 3
check responses
check timers
OutV          !
Fig. 4. The TDB Distance-Bounding protocol with PRF Masking [5]
We fix this PRF-based problem by using PRF masking [5,7,8] as shown in Fig. 4.
There, the vectors a are chosen by the verifier. So, the malicious prover cannot induce
some properties onto a to mount distance frauds.
But, we can also mount a man-in-the-middle attack by PRF programming. Given
a PRF g, we first define a predicate trapdoorx(a¯kt)() t = gx(a¯) right half(x). It
must be hard, by playing with a gx oracle, to construct a string satisfying this predicate.
However, when playing with the prover in a learning phase, and using the challenges
c= (1; : : : ;1;3; : : : ;3), the adversary obtains such a string a¯. We define
fx(NP;NV ) =
8<:a1ka2 = akbkgkbgx(a) if :trapdoorx(NV )where (a;b;g) = gx(NP;NV )a1ka2 = xkx otherwise
We can easily see that f is a PRF. Then, the learning phase works as follows:
1: play with P and send c= (1; : : : ;1;3; : : : ;3) to obtain from the responses a¯kt satis-
fying trapdoorx
2: play with P again with NV = a¯kt and get x
Based on x, the adversary can impersonate the prover.
In [5], we report other protocols which are weak, with respect to PRF programming
(see Table 2).
We do not fix this problem by primarily proposing another protocol but by firstly
requiring a new security assumption on the PRF f . Indeed, we somehow require that
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Table 2. Protocol which can be Broken by PRF Programming Techniques [5]
Protocol Distance-Fraud MIM
TDB Avoine-Lauradoux-Martin [2]
p p
Du¨rholz-Fischlin-Kasper-Onete [17]
p
–
Hancke-Kuhn [20]
p
–
Avoine-Tchamkerten [3]
p
–
Reid-Nieto-Tang-Senadji [34]
p p
Swiss-Knife Kim-Avoine-Koeune-Standaert-Pereira [25] –
p
leaking fx(y), sometimes fx(y) x, and sometimes a mixture of both, does not com-
promise the security. More precisely, we require the (e;T )-circular keying property [8].
This assumes that an adversary A of complexity at most T making queries of the form
(yi;ai;bi) to an oracle
y;a;b 7! (a  x0)+(b  fx(y))
cannot distinguish (up to an advantage e) whether x and x0 have been selected by having
x = x0 or x and x0 are independent. To make it possible, the adversary must follow the
constraint that for each i1; : : : ; iq;c1; : : : ;cq satisfying yi1 =   = yiq and åqj=1 c jbi j = 0,
we have thatåqj=1 c jai j = 0. As a sanity check, we prove that this notion makes sense by
constructing a circular-keying secure PRF in the random oracle model [8]. Furthermore,
this property excludes programmed PRFs as per mentioned before.
All the previous protocols assume that there is no noise to harm the protocol ex-
ecution. However, the distance bounding phase is subject to high constraints. Indeed,
an allowed error of one microsecond in the time measurement will correspond to an
imprecision of 300 meters in the distance estimate, due to the speed of light. Clearly,
this may not defeat relay attacks. To reach a precision of 10 meters, the prover shall
not spend more than 33 nanoseconds for receiving ci, computing ri, and sending ri.
So, computation or transmission will eventually be subject to noise. To keep the com-
pleteness property, we need to tolerate a linear number of errors, depending on the noise
level. Thus, in the following protocol (depicted on Fig. 5), only t out of n rounds should
be correct for a successful run of the protocol.
As noticed by Hancke [19], this introduces a new vulnerability to terrorist fraud.
The idea of his attack is that the malicious prover will run the initialization phase, then
for t out of n values of i he will reveal the response function ci 7! ri to the adversary.
This will only leak t bits of x which is not enough to impersonate the prover. Then, the
adversary will be able to correctly answer t rounds to pass the protocol. (To make the
attack work, the selection of the t out of n values of i must be fixed.)
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Verifier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
pick a, NV
NP            pick NP
M = a fx(NP;NV ) M;NV          ! a=M fx(NP;NV )
distance bounding phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1;2;3g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =
8<:
a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
xia1;ia2;i if ci = 3
#fi : ri and timeri correctg  t OutV          !
Fig. 5. The TDB Distance-Bounding protocol with PRF Masking and Noise Tolerance
3 The SKI Protocol
To address all previously noticed vulnerabilities, we introduce the SKI protocol.1 This
protocol appeared in [7,8]. It enjoys provable security. The protocol is depicted in Fig. 6.
There, the function f must be a PRF with circular-keying security.
Given a vector µ, the linear function Lµ is defined by
Lµ(x) = (µ  x; : : : ;µ  x)
Namely, all bits are set to the dot product between µ and x. With x0 = Lµ(x), Hancke’s
terrorist fraud would reveal a majority of the bits of x0 thus leaking Lµ(x). Since Lµ is
not chosen by the prover, by repeating the attack, we can collect enough information
about x to reconstruct x. So, Hancke’s terrorist fraud is prevented.
We let s denote the bit-length of the secret x. I.e., it is no longer necessarily equal to
n, the number of rounds.
We define the following function:
B(n;t;q) =
n
å
i=t
n
i

qi(1 q)n i
To study completeness, we assume that there is a probability of pnoise that one round is
incorrectly executed by honest players. The probability that an honest prover, close to
the verifier, passes the protocol is B(n;t;1  pnoise). By using the Chernoff bound [12],
this is greater than 1  e 2e2n for
t
n
< 1  pnoise  e (1)
1 The name SKI comes from the first names of the authors: Serge, Katerina, and Ioana.
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Verifier Prover
secret: x secret: x
initialization phase
NP            pick NP
pick a;Lµ;NV
M;Lµ;NV          !
M = a fx(NP;NV ;Lµ) a=M fx(NP;NV ;Lµ)
x0 = Lµ(x) x0 = Lµ(x)
distance bounding phase
for i= 1 to n
pick ci 2 f1;2;3g
start timeri
ci          !
stop timeri
ri            ri =
8<:
a1;i if ci = 1
a2;i if ci = 2
x0ia1;ia2;i if ci = 3
#fi : ri and timeri correctg  t OutV          !
Fig. 6. The SKI Distance-Bounding Protocol [7,8]
We now describe the best distance fraud against SKI. The malicious prover just
runs the initialization phase. During the distance-bounding phase, he anticipates the
challenge ci by sending some ri such that ri has the largest preimage set by the ci 7! ri
response function. This maximizes the chances to win. We can easily see that a single
round will pass with probability 34 . So, the distance fraud succeeds with probability
B(n;t; 34 ). By using the Chernoff bound, this is lower than e
 2e2n when
t
n
>
3
4
+ e (2)
The best man-in-the-middle attack runs as follows: the adversary first relays mes-
sages between the prover and the verifier in the initialization phase. Then, he plays with
the prover a distance-bounding phase to learn some answers. He can then play with the
verifier, with the responses that he has learnt, or with random ones if he ignores the
correct one. The probability to pass a round correctly is 23 . So, the man-in-the-middle
attack succeeds with probability B(n;t; 23 ). By using the Chernoff bound, this is lower
than e 2e2n when
t
n
>
2
3
+ e (3)
The best collusion fraud consists of running the initialization phase between the ma-
licious prover and the verifier. Then, the prover selects some c1; : : : ;c

n and set F

i (c) =
Fi(c) for each c 6= ci , where Fi is the response function ci 7! Fi(ci) = ri. The Fi (ci )
values are set to random bits. Then, the prover gives the table of F to the adversary
who uses it as a response function. Clearly, this leaks no information about x0. The prob-
ability to pass a round correctly is 56 . So, the collusion fraud succeeds with probability
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B(n;t; 56 ). By using the Chernoff bound, this is lower than e
 2e2n when
t
n
>
5
6
+ e (4)
To summarize equations (1)-(2)-(3)-(4), whenever pnoise < 16  2e, we can adjust t
and have the failure cases bounded by e 2e2n. Actually, we can formally prove that the
above attacks are optimal. We obtain the following result.
Theorem 1 (Boureanu-Mitrokotsa-Vaudenay [8]). If f is a (e;T )-circular-keying se-
cure PRF and the verifier requires at least t correct rounds,
– all distance frauds (with complexity bounded by T ) have a success probability
bounded by Pr[success] B(n;t; 34 )+ e;
– all man-in-the-middle attacks (with complexity bounded by T ) have a success prob-
ability bounded by Pr[success] B(n;t; 23 )+ r
2
2 2
 k+e, where k is the nonce length
and r is the number of participants in the experiment;
– for all collusion frauds such that p= Pr[CF succeeds] B( n2 ;t  n2 ; 23 )1 c and p 1
polynomially bounded, there is an associated man-in-the-middle attack with P
such that Pr[MiM succeeds]  1 B( n2 ;t  n2 ; 23 )cs, for any c.
Although it does not explicitly appear for distance-fraud and man-in-the-middle, we
note that s plays a role in the e anyway: if s is too small, f cannot be a secure PRF so e
cannot be negligible.
To optimize t with respect to the expected loss in the case of a failed authentication
or of an attack, we can follow the method in [16]. It requires to quantify all possible
types of losses.
There exist several variants of SKI with different properties. Namely, we can con-
sider secret sharing schemes other than the one in Fig. 6. We can consider other leakage
schemes Lµ as well. We refer to [7,8] for details.
4 Conclusion
Modeling the different types of frauds for distance-bounding is not easy. When adopting
an appropriate model, we can see that none of the existing distance-bounding protocols
in the literature resist all frauds, with the exception of SKI. SKI is very lightweight,
with several possible variants, of which herein we showed two. Under the assumption
that the underlying primitive is a PRF with circular-keying security and that the level
of noise in each round (in honest executions) is lower than 16 , we can achieve provable
secure distance-bounding.
As future work, we will optimize the protocol to adjust the key sizes and number of
rounds in an adequate way. We also leave open the problem of making a secure protocol
without the pnoise < 16 limitation. For instance, we could try to defeat man-in-the.middle
attacks in a different way than by introducing a secret sharing scheme [2]. Namely, we
could use a challenge set of two elements and authenticate the received challenges at
the end, as done in the Swiss-Knife protocol [25]. This way, we could reach a level of
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noise pnoise close to 14 . One problem with this option is that proving security does not
seem easy and, finally, it may be weak against PRF programming [5].
Another line of research consists of adding privacy preservation. People already
suggested to protect location privacy [33], but this suffers from severe limitations as
shown in [1,27]. Anonymity could also be considered in a way similar to RFID proto-
cols [37,32,23]. One proposal is made in [22] but without terrorist fraud protection.
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